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CONFLICT IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
AND THE USE OF THREAT:
THE GOLDSTREAM CONTROVERSY
COLIN J. B. WOOD*
INTRODUCTION
A major problem facing managers of public goods is the
integration of public opinion into the decisionmaking process. Some
form of participation has almost always been present at the level of
local government, but only recently has it become a feature of
metropolitan, regional or even national governments. At the latter
scales of political organization the emergence of interest and pressure
groups testifies that the traditional political frameworks are viewed
by many citizens as inadequate: in short, the public wants to be
heard, and now! Responses to this demand have varied: the auto-
cratic planner sees it as his nemesis; the efficiency expert a night-
mare; and the political aspirant, another bandwagon to jump upon.
Numerous problems are associated with implementation of public
participation in the decisionmaking process. There may be no legal
requirement for a particular decisionmaking group to consult with
the public. If an inquiry or public hearing is required, the manager
may be faced with a bewildering range of responses or complete
apathy. There may be budget or time constraints which demand
quick decisions and prohibit lengthy discussion and debate. To the
public the managers may appear paternal and distant, while the
agencies of government they have to deal with may seem, or even
may be, a maze of Kafkaesque proportions.
Because of these problems, and clearly only a few have been
mentioned, it is essential to make provision for input from citizens at
different stages of a public decisionmaking situation, and that to pay
some attention to it, lest prolonged and stressful conflict result. This
is not to assert that conflict is solely a negative and costly burden to
society; on the contrary, it provides a sharp reminder and signal that
changes in public attitudes and preferences can and do occur. Never-
theless, any modifications to existing decisionmaking structures
which can alleviate conflict must be examined.
*Professor of Geography, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia. The author
wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Jennifer Thomson, Nancy Ratcliffe and Cliff Ban-
croft in data collection, the various public officials in Victoria who co-operated in interviews
and in supplying information, and Dr. W. R. Derrick Sewell of the University of Victoria,
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An example of the conflict which can occur in a community
between a resource manager and the public if no provision exists for
input of citizens' views and preferences took place in Victoria,
British Columbia, over allocation of water between urban needs and
requirements of a salmon spawning stream. A Water Commissioner
attempting to provide water as cheaply as possible clashed with
conservationists trying to maintain a minimum flow in a salmon
spawning stream. After refusing to provide water for the fish, the
Water Commissioner changed his position because of considerable
indirect pressure from the public. It was an issue widely reported in
the media, which raised both specific questions related to water
supply and jurisdiction over natural resources and more fundamental
ones pertaining to economic growth, environmental quality and the
role of the public in community decisionmaking.
This article attempts to unravel the threads of the conflict. Ini-
tially the nature of a decisionmaking at the metropolitan community
level is described to provide a broad framework for interpretation of
the structure of the system. More specific attention is given to the
form of conflict and the interaction between the groups involved in
the dispute, that is, the functioning system. Thus, some insight may
be gained into the nature of community conflict. From this may
come a clearer understanding of the ways in which public decision-
making structures may be modified to incorporate input from
interested citizens.
THE URBAN COMMUNITY AND DECISIONMAKING
A community consists of individuals and groups varying in power
and organization occupying a common location and linked by social,
economic, and political interactions.1 Individuals' rights to power are
delegated by the elective process to politicians who set policy and
make decisions concerning public goods and welfare, while a non-
elected technical bureaucracy implements them. The structure of the
system is formally defined in respect of representation, jurisdiction,
time framework and amount of public participation.
Two models have been proposed to describe the general ways in
which the community decisionmaking system actually functions.2
Maass suggests that it works as an "upward forming consensus" in
1. For recent assessments of community structure and decision making see, Community
Structure and Decision Making: Comparative Analyses (T. Clark ed. 1968). A locational
emphasis is found in K. Cox, Conflict Power and Politics in the City: A Geographic View
(1973).
2. An excellent discussion of them can be found in O'Riordan, Towards a Strategy of
Involvement, in Perceptions and Attitudes in Resources Management 99-101 (W. Sewell & 1.
Burton eds. 1971).
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which a majority of the citizens delegate power to an elected group
of politicians (the proximate decisionmakers), who in turn enact
legislation and formulate policies implemented by the administrative
bureaucracy (Figure 1). Should inconsistencies develop between
electors and elected, the latter are liable to be dismissed at the next
election. If there were a free exchange of information between
decisionmakers and the public and active citizen participation in civic
affairs, we might accept this description.3
The system has also been characterized as a counterflow process in
which decisions are made at the top by a political or economic
"elite" and flow down to confront the community "after the fact"
(Figure 1). Consequently, those groups which feel threatened by the
decision bargain in a gaming-type process placed under uncertain
conditions until a mutually advantageous situation is arrived at.4
Thus, groups have goals, develop strategies and resort to varying
tactics to achieve them.
The realities of community decisionmaking at the level of urban/
regional government would seem to be more accurately described by
the second model. The first model assumes that a free and con-
tinuous exchange of information between the decisionmakers and
the public occurs, is comprehended without divergent perceptions
and attitudes, and is incorporated into the decisionmaking process:
assumptions which are clearly unrealistic. The second model is
supported by the abundant evidence concerning the power structures
of communities, the behavior of interest groups over community
issues and the common occurrence of communication and attitudinal
gaps between the decisionmakers and the public. In particular the
second model results when a majority of citizens are usually willing
to delegate their interests in government, almost to the state of
abdication, as long as decisionmakers perform adequately and do not
deviate too much from past performance. Only when it feels threat-
ened does the public respond.
The structure of the decisionmaking system may be hypothesized
to function as follows (see Figure 2):
(1) the community has evolved a delegative, decisionmaking struc-
ture to process problems;
(2) the allocation of power, authority, control and procedure is
specified by laws, statutes, etc;
(3) problems occur which confront the community and have to be
3. See R. Bish & R. Warren, Scale and Monopoly Problems in Urban Government Ser-
vices, 8 Urban Affairs Q. 97-122.
4. See e.g., J. Wolpert, -Departures from the Usual Environment in Locational Analysis,
60 Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 220-29 (1970).
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FIGURE 2
Response to Environmental Stress
resolved and are "processed" according to responsibilities
designated under (2);
(4) the decisionmakers may be ignorant of (3), ignore them, classify
them as "routine," or treat them as a strategic problem and
attempt to solve them;
(5) the public responds according to the degree of perceived threat.
Many types of conflict can exist in a community; we are con-
cerned here with the conflict which can emerge between the
community and the decisionmakers to whom they have delegated
power. Thus, conflicts may develop if politicans are ignorant of,
ignore, or misread the public's wishes. For example, a city council
may designate and deal with a problem as a "routine" matter, for
example, letting the executive bureaucracy solve the problem with-
out evaluating the reaction of affected groups. As a result, the groups
may respond by contacting and pressuring aldermen, petitioning or
even demonstrating. A differentiation can be made between the
"routine problem," which can be dealt with according to existing
procedures, and a nonroutine or "strategic" problem, which requires
evaluation and decisions and a potential departure from existing
policies.' Where strategic problems confront a community decision-
making system they are described as "stresses," and when they are
perceived as potential threats to the actor or system, politicians
respond to them as "strains." Such problems constitute a crisis when
the strains become hazardous.6 The occurrence of a particular
5. This may be compared with "programmed" (routine) and "'non-programmed"
(strategic) problems suggested in H. Simon, The Shape of Automation for Men and Manage-
ment 58-68 (1965).
6. R. Kasperson, Environmental Stress and the Municipal Political System, The Structure
of Political Geography, 581-96 (Kasperson & Minghi eds. 1969).
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strategic problem may generate debate and controversy between
decisionmakers and impacted groups. Questions then arise as to (1)
the nature or object of conflict and (2) the nature of interaction
between the opposed groups, i.e., the conflict behavior.
It must be emphasized that if crisis and conflict were the usual
pattern of activity in a community, it would be in perpetual turmoil.
Fortunately, extreme conflict situations are abnormal events in the
context we are discussing, but they do occur occasionally and exact
considerable economic, social and political costs. Thus, such situa-
tions need to be analyzed and understood. We can turn now from
generalities of community decisionmaking to the actual object of
conflict and the conflict behavior involved.
THE OBJECT OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT BEHAVIOR
Conflict can be defined as a disagreement between two or more
parties over a matter of common interest. 7 The areas, types and
degree of conflict behavior can assume a multiplicity of forms, rang-
ing from verbal exchange to physical violence. Procedures may exist
whereby the incompatabilities can be resolved without resort to
force; at a macro scale these are the general processes of government
and at a micro scale, courts and tribunals. The outcome of conflict
resolution procedures may result in one party winning and the other
losing, a sum zero situation, but more often than not, particularly
where a publicly owned resource is at issue, a form of compromise,
sharing, compensation or trade-off occurs. It is useful to differentiate
between the object of conflict and the actual conflict behavior.
The Object of Conflict
A situation can be described in respect to the object of conflict:'
what are the parties fighting about? We already assume that the
physical object is a natural resource and that the conflict stems from
its allocation. Although the resource may be a clearly defined object,
e.g., water, it may be perceived and valued differently by the groups
involved, creating a further dimension to the conflict. Thus, the
object of conflict could be viewed in terms of any, or a combination
of any, of the following ways:
(1) As a conflict in perception; if the decisionmakers are unaware
that a problem exists, they misread the public's response. This is
perhaps encapsuled in the phrase, "What is all the fuss about?"
7. While there are many kinds of conflict situations there is no real agreement over the
meaning of the concept, see K. Boulding, Conflict and Defense (1963); Bergstrom, What is a
Conflict of lnterest J. of Peace Research 197-217 (1970).
8. Bergstrom, supra note 7.
[Vol. 16
CONFLICT IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
(2) As a conflict in attitude and values; the decisionmakers are
aware of a problem, but treat it as a relatively minor one that
can be dealt with by the bureaucracy in a routine fashion,
whereas the public or an interest group views it as a strategic
issue, e.g., "They're making mountains out of molehills;"
(3) As a conflict of interest; decisionmakers, aware of a problem,
classify it as stategic but choose a solution discordant with the
wishes of the majority or, more commonly, fail to communicate
their rationale or reasons for the choice, e.g. "We know what's
best for you."
Much recent research into perceptions and attitudes has investi-
gated the subjective variations which can occur between different
individuals and groups. The mental structuring of the external world
is, however, only one part of the problem, since groups in conflict
are interacting, a process which itself could modify their perceptions
and behavior.
Forms of Interaction among Groups: Conflict Behavior
A conflict situation may be described in terms of the forms of
interaction between the opposing groups, the conflict behavior.9 If
the response of an affected party is weak, poorly organized or non-
existent, there may be no conflict behavior, even though an object of
conflict is present. This has frequently been the case in the areas of
urban redevelopment, minority rights and environmental quality.
Several conceptual models describing the behavior of parties in
conflict have been proposed. The simplest is the reaction process
model in which conflicts are described as the escalation of reactions
between two opponents." 0 Similarly, models of negotiation portray
the conflict process as one of making, accepting or rejecting bids.''
Where players maintain control over their moves, have a range of
options, a scale of utilities and a set of expectations, game theoretical
models are relevant. A further differentiation is made between the
"fixed sum game," in which one player loses if the other wins, and
"mixed motives" games, in which players as a group may win or lose
to a banker or "nature" as well as from each other.' 2
Gaming concepts are normative in that behavior is assumed to.be
rational and that players wish to maximize gains or minimize
losses.' ' The way in which a player acts in a game is linked to two
9. For geographical implications see Eyles, Space, Territory and Conflict (University of
Reading, Department of Geography Discussion Paper, No. 1 1969).
10. 1. Richrdson, Arms and Insecurity (1960).
11. See, e.g., J. Cross, The Economics of Bargaining (1964).
12. A. Rapoport, Fights Games and Debates (1961).
13. See, e.g., R. Wyer, Prediction of Behavior in Two Person Games, J. of Personality and
January 19761
NA TURA L RESOURCES JOURNAL
other concepts, one based on cognition of expected events and the
other on accumulated experience. Also determinative of acts are the
player's perception of risk and the amount of information available.
Each of these ideas represents an attempt to understand the actual
process of interaction, whether it be negotiation or conflict. They
can be viewed as specific submodels relevant to understanding the
confrontations which may occur in a community where decisions
flow down from the top. Yet, a common deficiency of them appears
to be that little attention is paid to the actual nature of interaction
between conflicting parties, that is, the communicative act itself, a
surprising neglect in view of its possible influence on subsequent
interaction.' This is of particular concern in the present context,
since communication is the nexus between the public and their
decisionmakers.
Wolpert in his analysis of interdependence in locational behavior
has drawn attention to the framework proposed by Lazarus of
linking threat with stress response to understand the linkage between
parties involved in a conflict. Lazarus hypothesizes a two stage
appraisal of environmental cues about potential threats based first on
"initial evaluation" and second on the "subsequent appraisal" as an
appropriate coping strategy. He suggests that the latter may be
accompanied by various dysfunctional stress reactions related to the
effectiveness of the strategy, for example, less adaptive behavior;
more tendency to aggression; fixation on untested hypotheses;
increased error rate; stereotyped responses; disorganized activity;
problem solving rigidity; less belief in benign environment and
reliance on ad hoc communications channels. 5
The idea of threat and stress response not only bears on under-
standing selection and use of tactics by the parties involved in a
confrontation but also clearly has some value for explaining the
success of certain tactics and the outcome of particular games.
This conceptual review provides a framework for understanding
the processes of confrontation which can take place between
decisionmakers and the public. The remainder of the paper is con-
cerned with examining the Goldstream River conflict in terms of this
framework. The structure of the allocation of control over the re-
source is described, followed by the way in which the issue
developed. The conflict is analyzed as a gaming situation in which
community leaders and conservation groups are the chief players. An
Social Psychology, 222-238 (1969); A. Rapoport & A. Chammak, Prisoner's Dilemma: A
Study in Conflict and Cooperation (1965).
14. Patchen, Models of Cooperation and Conflict, Conflict Resolution 389-407 (1970).
15. R. Lazarus, Psychological Stress and the Coping Process (1966).
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assessment of the use of threat as a tactic explains the outcome of
the game.
CONFLICT IN WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The Issue
As the population of the Greater Victoria region increased from
90,000 in 1941 to 175,000 in 1968, so did the demand for water.
The Greater Victoria Water Board, which manages the water system
on behalf of the constituent municipalities of the metro region, has
responded to this demand by increasing the supply system. Until the
early 1960's enough water was left after supplying the needs of the
urban areas to maintain an adequate flow of water in the Goldstream
River, one of the streams in the Board's catchment area, for salmon
spawning (Figure 3).
As population and water consumption continued to increase, more
water was abstracted from the Goldstream River. This, coupled with
below average precipitation in several years, reduced water levels,
endangering spawning salmon.' 6 A major conflict flared in fall 1970
when the Water Commissioner announced that no water would be
released for salmon spawning in that year. Although a major exten-
sion to the catchment system was under construction, it was still
incomplete, so that water supplies were very low.
As might be expected, there was intense opposition from conserva-
tion groups within the community. They eventually brought enough
pressure to bear on the decisionmakers that the latter agreed to
release sufficient water to ensure the migration of the salmon. The
object of conflict was the allocation of water and the values placed
on it as a resource. The conflict behavior took the form of a gaming
interaction in which threats were an important tactic.
Control over the Allocation of the Water Resource
In Canada several levels of government with their associated execu-
tive agencies have jurisdiction over water use. The Federal govern-
ment concentrates on those aspects of water resource management
assigned to it by the British North America Act, particularly sections
91, 92, 95 and 132. It has sole jurisdiction over use of water for
navigation and fisheries, cojurisdiction over agricultural uses and
authority to intervene in interprovincial disputes or those arising over
a water body shared with the United States. The provinces have
jurisdiction over uses not assigned to the federal authority, for
16. These are returning adult salmon from fingerlings spawned four years previously.
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example, hydroelectric power.1 7 Since some overlap of responsibil-
ities inevitably occurs between the two government levels, special
federal-provincial agencies have been established to coordinate
management of water where this seems appropriate. At the local level
water supply is controlled by municipalities as a utility or private
companies. Such local bodies are not required to consider the impact
of their decisions on other types of water use unless a license to
abstract water, issued by the provincial government, was required at
the inception of the use. Furthermore, formal channels of com-
munication do not usually exist between this and the two other
levels of government.
The Greater Victoria Water District
Population growth in the Lower Vancouver Island area and the
concomitant increase in demand for water, mainly for residential
purposes, led to amalgamations of local water supply systems,
culminating in the formation of the Greater Victoria Water Board in
1949.1 8 It was formed to construct and maintain facilities for sup-
plying water to the several municipalities which comprise the
metropolitan region. The system is managed by a full time Water
Commissioner under the control of a Water Board. The Board has
seven members, the Mayor and three aldermen from Victoria, and
the mayors of Esquimalt, Oak Bay and Saanich. The Board makes
policy decisions and relies on the Commissioner for technical advice
and routine operation of the system.
Since its establishment in 1949, the only decisions required of the
Board seemed routine, related to maintenance and gradual expansion
of the system, neither of which seemed to necessitate an elaborate
policy making procedure, in view of accessible and relatively abun-
dant supplies of water. Decisions were made by the board, whose
members were not directly responsible to the public or munici-
palities, financially or otherwise.
At the time of the conflict the Board also exercised a certain
independence from the various provincial and federal agencies
because, unlike most bodies which withdraw water from streams or
lakes, the Board did not have to apply for a water license from the
B.C. Comptroller of Water Rights, and therefore was presumably not
subject to the rules and regulations to which other water abstractors
must adhere under the B.C. Water Act. The City of Victoria was
17. In 1970 the Federal Government passed the Canada Water Act (Bill C.142), a
declaration of intent to manage the waters of Canada more effectively. The Act recognizes
the need for cooperation between federal and provincial authorities.
18. An Act to incorporate the Greater Victoria Water District. Stat. of British Columbia
C.28 (consolidated 1961).
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granted sole rights to the waters in the Sooke and Goldstream areas
under a special Act of the Legislature, enacted in 1909.1 9 Because it
is a publicly-owned corporation, the water district, through its
Board, sets its own prices for water. It does not have to submit its
rates to the Public Utilities Commission for approval, as private water
utilities do.
While the Board can be held responsible for any harmful effects
that the operations of the District's water supply system may have
on individuals or groups, it is under no obligation to assist them in
the pursuit of their own objectives, especially if these conflict with
the District's goals and perceived responsibilities. The Board feels, for
example, that it has no obligation to provide recreational facilities.
Moreover, because it believes that use of its reservoirs for bathing,
boating, or fishing would increase costs of operation, the Board bans
use of reservoirs for such purposes. 2 0 It also feels it has no responsi-
bility to preserve fish runs by the release of water from its reservoirs,
despite suggestions to the contrary by fisheries management agencies,
particularly at the federal level.
There are no formal channels of communication between the
Water Board and other government agencies at the municipal, provin-
cial or federal level. While there are sometimes informal contacts
between personnel of the Commission and those of other agencies,
these are usually of an ad hoc nature. Nor are there any formal
communications channels between the Board and the public at large.
While policy making in water management agencies often involves
some form of public consultation, such as public meetings or hear-
ings, the Water Board does not consult the public in this fashion. It
relies instead on the judgment of its members and the advice of the
Water Commissioner to determine the public wants and how it is
likely to react to policies. From this brief description of the alloca-
tion of control of water we can now examine the conflict which
arose over its use.
THE CONFLICT AS A GAME
The chronological development of events in the conflict over
water use is shown in Figure 4.21 The problem first appeared in the
early 1960's. Conflict between the water managers and the conserva-
19. Greater Victoria Water Board, Growth and Development of Greater. Victoria Water
Supply (undated mimeo). The city was actually given the right to negotiate with the
Esquimalt Waterworks Company who held the water rights, for its expropriation.
20. Interview with R. Upward, Water Comm'r, Greater Victoria Water District.
21. This information is based on interviews with the water commissioner and the mayor,
and press statements in the Victoria Daily Times, 1964-1970.
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FIGURE 4
The Growth of Involvement in the Goldstream Controversy
tionists, two groups with well-defined goals and a common interest in
the resource, gradually increased. The water managers had legitimate
power to act in terms of managing the resource, but the conserva-
tionists seemed to have little. The game had certain predictable
elements, such as that the demand for water would continue to grow
and that the salmon would need a specific volume of water at critical
periods in their life cycles.
In 1970 the amount of precipitation that could be expected,
particularly prior to and during the spawning period, was uncertain.
The conservationists were uncertain whether water would be re-
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leased, and the water managers whether saving water by the com-
munity would be possible. Neither group was sure how much water
was needed for the fish, although the Water Commissioner suggested
it might be 250,000 to 500,000 gallons a day. Each group had strat-
egies for attaining their goals and reducing uncertainty. As the
dispute became more intense, each group evaluated the uncertainties
and the activities of the other group and adopted more specific
tactics. For convenience in this discussion, the various groups are
dichotomized into the water managers (the Water Commissioner, the
Water Board members) and the conservationists (environmental
groups, individuals, segments of the public).
The Water Managers: Goals and Strategies
The goals of the water managers were stated throughout the affair
as selling water to the community and ensuring that an adequate
reserve capacity was always available. This basic function is set out
by the Greater Victoria Water District Act. A strategy of expanding
the system to ensure increased supplies has been pursued. Municipal-
ities who purchased water from the Water Board concurred in this
policy because they themselves relied on revenue from water sales
and hence encouraged consumption. 2 2 In 1964 it was decided to
expand supplies to meet projected demand until 2000 by construct-
ing a new pipeline scheduled for completion in 1970. At the time of
the 1970 crisis the extensions were incomplete. While the expansion-
ist policy did mean that water would eventually be available, it
placed a constraint on what could be done with existing water. Water
had to be sold to raise revenue to help finance expansion of the
system.
Conservationists: Goals and Strategies
The goal of the various conservation groups was to protect the
salmon stocks of the Goldstream River.2 I The strategy of this group
was based on educating the general public to gain support for the
conservationists' viewpoint, particularly by encouraging local school
children to tour spawning areas and by increasing the stock of
salmon.24 In this way the perceived importance of maintaining the
22. Water pricing varies among the four large municipalities who buy water from the
GVWB and then sell it to consumers. Victoria and Esquimalt have a decreasing block rate,
with a seasonable price variation. Oak Bay has a decreasing block rate. Saanich has a
metered flat rate. All buy from the GVWB at a flat rate.
23. This information is based on interviews with local conservationists and press state-
ments in the Victoria Daily Times, 1964-1970.
24. The salmon stock which spawns, consists of annual runs estimated at 8,000 chum,
19,500 Coho and some Chinook. The sports value of this population has been placed at
$100,000 per year, based mainly on expenditures of fishermen in catching the fish.
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salmon resource was gradually increased. More people were encour-
aged to see the fish and more fish were available to be seen.
The first strategem was successful. The degree of community
response appears to have been the critical influence which changed
the attitudes of the Mayor and Water Commissioner and persuaded
them to release water for the fish. The second tactic was probably
successful too, in that as stocks were increased, more salmon
returned to spawn and provided an even greater spectacle for the
public.
Interpretation
Decisions made by the water managers are representative of the
"downward flow" community decisionmaking process, in which a
decision is made at the top and threatened groups bargain in a game-
like situation to alter it to their advantage. Yet, the interaction
between the two groups cannot be explained simply as one group
reacting mechanically to the actions of another because of the
following uncertainties.
A choice of strategies was available to each side. The water
managers could control demand by rationing and pricing, thus enab-
ling water to be released for the fish. However, there was probably
insufficient time to institute such measures, and, as mentioned
earlier, they were dependent on the revenue from sales of water.2 5
The conservationists as a group depended on the successful coopera-
tion of several community subgroups and public support, often
tenuous at best. Resolution of the issue was also partly dependent on
the weather, since it would have been resolved immediately if suffi-
cient precipitation fell; this had been the case in incipient confronta-
tions between the groups prior to 1967.
Arranging the confrontation as a game situation aids in describing
the conflict behavior of the two sides. If the options available to the
community as one player and the water managers as the other are
arranged as a simple 2 x 2 strategy payoff matrix, some insight is
gained into the interaction and choices made. The potential inter-
actions are set out in Figure 5. Each player has a choice of two
strategies, cooperating or defecting (not cooperating). The water
managers (B) could supply water for the salmon or withhold it; the
community (A) could use water or save it.
If both parties cooperate (C,C) there is a certain reward; the
community saves some water and the manager releases a sufficient
25. The GVWB debt is $3.25 million, requiring $400,000 in interest payments per year.
Water was sold to the municipalities at 13.5 cents per 1000 gallons. If 5 m.g.p.d. were
released it would mean a loss of $675 per day in revenue.
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Interaction Between the Decisionmakers and the Community
as a Simple 2 x 2 Game
amount to maintain the fish, but there are some costs: The managers
have less revenue and the consumers have dried out lawns! Joint
action defeats the perversity of nature. There are, however, strong
temptations not to cooperate. The community as a whole may be
quite apathetic and not bother to save water, or may think that
someone will look after the problem at no cost to themselves while
COMMUNITY
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they continue to use water (D,C). The manager may keep, not re-
lease, water irrespective of some saving by the public because of the
revenue factor (C,D). If both sides do not cooperate (D,D), the com-
munity has clean cars, green lawns, and the water managers revenues,
but the salmon of the 1970 cycle are eliminated, a greater long-term
social loss to the community.
THE GAME AS PLAYED
In the early phase of interaction between the two sides the com-
munity was using water, while the managers were persuaded by the
conservationists to release water (D,C). As the resource diminished in
quantity and the managers' perception of risk increased, they
switched to withholding water, strategy D. Consequently, the two
sides were locked into a double-defection situation (D,D). On the
one hand, the community was apparently apathetic about the fate of
the fish, while the managers were more interested in the short-run
value of the game (D,D). The water managers were defecting (D), and
in the absence of any other information (that the community as a
whole wanted fish) were acting rationally. The penalty for releasing
water for fish, if the community did not at the same time conserve it,
(D,C) was too high to entertain.
The community was using water (D) because, in the absence of
any other information, there was no real reason to save. The role of
the conservationists, who could see the implications of the (D,D)
trap, was only too clear. On the other hand, they had to encourage
the community to adopt a "save" tactic but avoid a "sucker's pay-
off' situation (C,D); in which water was saved but still not released
by the water manager. The manager, in fact, used the likelihood of
the sucker's payoff situation as a threat to the conservationists. The
conservationists had to offset the water manager's threat by using
political threats and other pressures to encourage him to give water
so that a cooperative situation would occur (C,C).
The Use of Threats
During the game the strategies used by both sides changed. An
important communicative act which can be linked to these changes
was use of threats by both sides either to reinforce a strategy and
thereby influence their opponents or to counter a threat. These
threats, which were exchanged almost entirely via the mass media,
varied in frequency and degree (Table 1 )." 6 During the early phases
26. For a more detailed discussion of the content analysis aspects see W. Sewell & C.
Wood, Environmental Decision Making and Environmental Stress: the Goldstream Contro-
versy, Proceedings of the Canadian Association of Geographers (1971).
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of the game (in the year preceding 1970 and early 1970) the threats
were general in content, "people before fish" (managers) or "protect
the fish against people" (conservationists), and low level.
TABLE 1
Frequency and Type of Statement Made by the Two Principal Groups
to the Press, Which Could Be Interpreted as Threats By Their Opponents
Threats Leveled by Threats Leveled by 4
Water Managers Total Conservationists Total
People before fish 1964 Save water 1970(7) 7
1969(2)
1970(2) 5 Fish have economic 1964
value 1969
Future threat 1964 1970(3) 5
1967
1970(2) 4 Discredit opposition 1970(4) 4
Discredit opposition 1970(3) 3 Political threat 1969(2)
1970(2) 4
Threat to property 1970(2) 2
Protect fish v. 1964
Economic threat 1970(2) 2 people 1969(2) 3
Future supplies
are good 1970 1
Source: Victoria Times (1964-1970)
N.B. Figures in brackets indicate the number of times the threat was used in one year.
As it became apparent to the conservationists that the managers'
strategy of not releasing water was unchanged, they campaigned to
encourage the community to save water to protect the fish. This
represented not only a direct economic threat to the water managers,
but also brought into question their perception of what the public
wanted: they believed that most people preferred water to fish. The
managers responded with more direct counter threats, referring to
the economic cost to the community, the potential damage to
unwatered lawns, the credibility of the conservationists, and the
probable failure of a water saving campaign.
Public response to the conservationists' plea was considerable
(estimates vary, but probably there was a reduction in daily con-
sumption of close to one million gallons, sufficient in terms of the
Water Commissioner's estimate of spawning and migration require-
ments to maintain the fisheries) and meant that the game had moved
to the (C,D) cell of the matrix. 2  The enthusiastic public response
27. The results of a questionnaire survey of a sample of schools in the Greater Victoria
area showed that there was a significant, active response by children who had visited Gold-
stream Park. Teachers were also instrumental in encouraging children to take an interest in
the water saving campaign.
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partly represented the success of the conservationists' strategy of
encouraging educational visits to the Goldstream River, since school
children in the region became particularly keen on saving water and
encouraged their parents to do the same, and resulted partly from
the proconservation coverage of the media. The relative success of
the campaign not only muted the threats leveled by the managers but
showed that they were out of touch with a significant proportion of
the public. The managers responded to the water saving campaign by
expanding the reasons for not releasing water, arguments which
seemed rational to them but were further threats to the conserva-
tionists, e.g., the fish were not worth saving, economic cost. Thus,
the water managers, who seemingly had legitimate power over alloca-
tion of the water, could couple the specific action of withholding
water with a variety of stated threats, either to the community as a
whole or to the conservationists, but they could not escalate action
as, for example, by cutting off water from those people who favored
the fish. Nor could they level any kind of political threat.
As support for the water saving campaign grew, the conserva-
tionists felt confident enough to appeal to other levels of government
and local politicians to champion their cause. The combination of
public support and encouragement from other levels of government
(the Federal Minister referred the Water Board to the Fisheries Act,
Section 120, Part 10, which compels the owners of dams and persons
altering the natural flow of streams to provide sufficient water for
fish), represented a political threat to the water managers aimed from
above and below. In addition, the Mayor received many letters
favoring release of water. Not surprisingly, the water managers
changed to a cooperative strategy (C,C), and the game had gone full
cycle.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
In what ways do interactions between the parties fit in with the
concepts of threat exchange and coping strategies described earlier?
Although the conflict over allocating water was low level, in the
sense that there was no personal danger to safety or health and that
violence was absent and personal abuse minimal, the conflict exhibits
many of the characteristics of stressful situations such as city hous-
ing, race relations and poverty. Initially, the water managers did not
see the conservationists as a serious threat; consequently, their cop-
ing strategy consisted of repeated slogans, "people before fish." The
real threat to the water managers appeared to be the falling reservoir
levels and the need to sell water to help finance the expanded supply
system. Public attitude was viewed as supportive.
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However, as possible elimination of the salmon cycle in
1970/1971 loomed, the magnitude of the threat to the conserva-
tionists increased, hence, the coping tactic of direct action through
an appeal to the public to save water. This strategy was viewed by
the managers as a greater threat, particularly when some public sup-
port was forthcoming. The water managers' response was to expand
the range of threats and appeal to the economic values of the
community. The conservationists' response was to issue counter-
threats and appeal to other levels of government, local politicians and
the public. Undoubtedly, pressure from several sources (see Figure 6)
led to the water managers' attitude change. After their change in
attitude, the water managers progressed through a "face saving"
phase, saying that all along they favored protecting the fish but also
had to think of the community's economic interests. This in itself
represents a further coping strategy, attempting to communicate
their rationale for action and restore their esteem in the public's eye.
Finally, it appears that the behavior of the water managers during
evolution of the conflict did exhibit the types of dysfunctional stress
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FIGURE 6
Statements in the Victoria Times, October-November 1970, urging the Mayor
and Water Commissioner to "save the salmon." Note the varied sources of
information, and the response by the water managers to try and justify their
actions (up to October 31). Also shown are the statements which can be
classified as threats and the letters received by the Mayor.
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reactions posited by Lazarus. As the confrontation developed, the
water managers clung to the idea that people came before fish (fixa-
tion on untested hypotheses); this response was repeated many times
(stereotyped response). They would only act according to the
Greater Victoria Water Board Act, despite the federal legislation
(problem solving rigidity) and finally yielded when pressure came
from several sources. Since there was no provision for public input,
they had to rely on ad hoc communication channels. The use of
threats as a communicative act can be related perhaps to their
increasingly aggressive tone as the issue evolved.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC
INVOLVEMENT IN WATER MANAGEMENT
It is possible to draw a number of conclusions from this examina-
tion of a resource use conflict which pertain to public decisionmak-
ing in general and water management in particular. Where decisions
flow down from the top and sections of the community respond
negatively, gaming terminology provides a realistic framework for
understanding the processes of interaction between the groups
involved. The concepts of threat, threat appraisal and coping enable
one to describe the communicative act and its influence on use of
strategy.
While it is not suggested that a direct input of public views into
the public decisionmaking process would eliminate conflict, the fact
that threats are used as a major form of communication where no
provision for citizens' views are made indicates that some form of
public input would at least mitigate conflict. It would seem unlikely
that stress will be eliminated from out society, but in view of the
costs involved (for example, the links between psychological stress
and physiological stress cannot be overlooked) any attempt to reduce
it should be welcomed. The critical question, how much stress can be
tolerated and is actually needed, remains to be answered.
This case study affirms the theory that the role of the public in
environmental decisionmaking is becoming increasingly important,
especially as the competition for resources increases. Public resource
managers must be prepared to recognize and accommodate this
phenomenon. In so doing, the present methods of gauging the pub-
lic's views and incorporating them into the decisionmaking process
will be inadequate. While the public is a loose and often mythical
concept, a step in the right direction would be to broaden the base of
representation on bodies such as water boards. Doing this might
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make decisionmakers more aware of changes in public values and
conscious that water is not simply an economic commodity.
The public reaction to the Goldstream issue not only illustrates
their keen awareness of environmental quality but also means that
indirectly people are questioning the general purposes of growth.
Thus, one of the direct implications of the issue should be a
thorough examination of pricing policy and demand management.
